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1 Introduction
Income inequalities are growing in many parts of the world causing dissatisfaction and comprom-
ising political stability. The spatial dimension of inequality has attracted considerable policy
interest, since regional disparities in economic activity, incomes and social indicators foster over-
all income inequality. Besides being a determinant of interpersonal inequality, spatial inequality
matters since it is often an outcome of ethnic conflicts and a breeding ground for separatist tend-
encies [Kanbur and Venables (2005)]. Despite the obvious importance of regional inequality, few
studies exist which analyze its causes systematically. The reason for the scarcity of research in this
field is mainly driven by poor availability of regional data which is necessary to analyze spatial
inequality. Regional data is rare in particular for developing and emerging economies so that the
existing studies mainly focus on high developed countries. Results of those studies are important
to understand the driving forces of regional inequality, but are difficult to generalize. This paper
contributes to the empirical literature on the determinants of spatial inequality by using a unique
data set covering countries of all continents and all levels of economic development.
One issue that has received a lot of attention in the public debate as well as in the academic
literature is the role of decentralization in regional inequalities. The major argument in the still
ongoing discussion is that decentralization enhances public sector efficiency [Oates (1972)], but
can weaken inter-jurisdictional redistribution causing a rise in regional inequality [Prud’homme
(1995)]. Thus, a conflict between efficiency and redistribution might arise from decentralization.
For many countries in the world this is an essential question, since there is a global trend of public
sector decentralization [Watts (2008)]. Examples include high developed countries such as Spain
or Belgium as well as emerging economies such as Chile or Brazil. Decentralization and its effects
are particularly relevant to developing countries, since the World Bank and other international
agencies consider decentralization as an important element of their development strategy [Gopal
(2008)].
The existing evidence on the redistributive consequences of decentralization is mixed. Some authors
find an increasing effect of decentralization on regional inequality [see e.g. Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill
(2004)], some authors find a decreasing effect [see e.g. Lessmann (2009) or Ezcurra and Pascual
(2008)], and some authors stress different effects for high and low income countries [see e.g. Shankar
and Shah (2003) or Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010)]. Reasons for the contradictory results are
the use of different country samples and observation periods, different measures of decentralization,
and different estimation techniques. Hence, there is still demand for a comprehensive empirical
study which uses a broader data set including countries of all stages of development, and which uses
alternative measures of political and fiscal decentralization as well as adequate empirical methods.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature.
Consequently, the paper analyzes the determinants of regional inequalities focusing on the impact
of the federal structure. For this purpose, I have collected a unique data set of 56 countries at all
stages of economic development covering the period from 1980 to 2009. In case of OECD coun-
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tries, data collection is quite easy since the OECD Regional Statistics, EUROSTAT, or Cambridge
Econometrics (CAMECON) provide regional data. In contrast, regional data for other countries
is often not publicly available and was provided by national statistical offices or central banks
on individual request. Most non-OECD countries in my data set are from South America and
Asia. Using these regional data to calculate measures of regional inequalities, it turns out that
inequalities are significantly higher in developing or emerging economics, and slightly rising within
the observation period. The main finding of this analysis is, however, that political as well as
fiscal decentralization decrease regional inequality. Moreover, interaction models show that the
relationship between decentralization and regional inequality depends on the level of economic
development. While decentralization tends to increase inequality in poorer countries, decentraliza-
tion decreases regional inequality in richer ones. The findings have important implications for the
design of federal systems in developed as well as developing countries. Several observers suspect
increasing regional inequalities in decentralizing countries and demand the implementation of in-
terregional transfer schemes. This study shows that this effect should not necessarily be a concern
in high developed countries, since decentralization decreases regional inequalities. Decentralization
initiatives in poor countries, however, should take the potential negative redistributional effects
into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the unique data set on
regional inequality. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework for the impact of decentraliza-
tion on regional inequality and summarizes the existing empirical studies. Section 4 presents the
econometric analysis. Finally, Section 5 sums up the results and concludes.
2 Regional inequality around the world
The restricting factor for empirical research on regional inequality is to get reliable regional data.
For comparative studies one needs regional economic or social accounts at a widely homogenous
territorial level for countries at all levels of economic development. The OECD Regional Statistics,
EUROSTAT, or CAMECON provide such data since the 1980s/1990s. However, data of developing
or emerging economies is scarce and cannot be accessed through one single data base. For this
study, the data was collected from several national statistical offices or central banks. But even if
regional data is available, measurement of regional inequality is difficult. Three different decisions
arise: (1) the choice of an appropriate economic indicator, (2) the choice of the territorial level to
be applied, and (3) the choice of applicable concentration measures.1
(ad 1) Cross-country studies on decentralization and regional inequality use regional per capita
income [Shankar and Shah (2003)], regional GDP per employee [Gil Canaleta et al. (2004)], or
regional GDP per capita [Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill (2004), Ezcurra and Pascual (2008), and Less-
mann (2009)] as a starting point for calculating disparity measures. All these indicators have their
specific advantages and drawbacks, in particular concerning the sensitivity against biases resulting
1 See Lessmann (2009) for a detailed discussion of different measurement concepts of regional inequality.
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from commuters or unequal (un-)employment. For this study, the regional GDP per capita is
best suitable since data on regional employment or household income is usually not available for
developing or emerging countries.
(ad 2) A further problem arises from the different sizes of the regions considered. In countries with
large economic differences and an unequally distributed population, a disparity measure might be
difficult to interpret. For example the wide Canadian Territories are much poorer than the regions
at the East and West coast so that an inequality measure might indicate large economic differences,
although very few people are affected from being poor (note that the territories are inhabited by
only 100,000 people in total). Therefore, it is necessary to use a territorial classification that creates
relatively homogeneous regions. I decided to use large regions (TL2) for countries covered by the
OECD Regional Statistics (e.g. Australia), NUTS2 regions for countries covered by EUROSTAT
and CAMECON (all EU members), and state/province level data otherwise (e.g. India, Brazil,
etc.).2 For non-OECD countries, data availability has driven the selection of the territorial levels.
In most cases, the regional level is equivalent to state or province level. A complete list of countries,
territorial levels, the period coverage and data sources is provided in Table A.1 in the appendix.
Note that I also calculate a disparity measure that is adjusted for the different population sizes
of the regions (WCV ), and I control for the number of sub-national units and country size in
the regression analysis to minimize a potential bias emerging from the heterogeneity of territorial
levels.
(ad 3) The last concern is the application of appropriate concentration measures. Different meas-
ures of inequality do not always provide the same country ranking. Especially in a cross-country
analysis, the concentration measure should be independent of the number of regions considered
(spatial independence), should not be sensitive to shifts in average GDP levels (mean independ-
ence), and should satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle [Dalton (1920), Pigou (1912)]. This
principle states that an arithmetical transfer from rich to poor regions reduces inequality [see Sen
(1973) and Mehran (1976) for details]. All three requirements are satisfied by the coefficient of
variation (CV ), the adjusted Gini coefficient (GINI ) and the population-weighted coefficient of
variation (WCV ):3
CV : =
1
y¯
[
1/n
n∑
i=1
(y¯ − yi)2
]1/2
, (1)
GINI : =
2
∑n
i=1 iyi
n
∑
i=1 yi
− n+ 1
n
, (2)
WCV : =
1
y¯
[
n∑
i=1
pi (y¯ − yi)2
]1/2
, (3)
y¯ is the country’s average GDP p.c., yi is the GDP p.c. of region i, pi is the share of the country’s
total population in region i, and n is the number of sub-national units.4 The new data set of
2 NUTS - Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. Note that I have used the NUTS3 territorial level in
case of Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta, since NUTS2 level data is not provided.
3 See Bendel et al. (1989) for a comparison of standard inequality measures.
4 Note that the Theil-index is not applicable for cross-section analysis with large variations in the number of
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regional inequalities considers 56 countries for the period 1980-2009. Note that the frequency
of the data varies by country: in case of the OECD countries the underlying panel is almost
balanced, but there are quite large gaps in the data of some developing economies. Table 1 presents
the means of these calculations for the whole observation period. In the following, I will discuss
Table 1: Regional Inequalities in Europe and Centra Asia
Country CV GINI WCV Country CV GINI WCV
Europe & Central Asia North America
Austria 0.21 0.14 0.22 Canada 0.26 0.16 0.15
Belgium 0.38 0.19 0.38 U.S. of America 0.36 0.14 0.17
Bulgaria 0.23 0.13 0.26 Latin America & Caribbean
Croatia 0.21 0.18 0.21 Argentina 0.36 0.18
Czech Republic 0.33 0.15 0.31 Bolivia 0.30 0.16 0.25
Denmark 0.11 0.09 0.09 Brazil 0.55 0.31 0.48
Finland 0.18 0.11 0.13 Chile 0.48 0.26 0.35
France 0.18 0.08 0.26 Colombia 0.65 0.31 0.43
Georgia 0.19 0.12 0.19 Mexico 0.51 0.26 0.55
Germany 0.19 0.10 0.17 Panama 0.60 0.38 0.46
Greece 0.19 0.08 0.16 Peru 0.51 0.30 0.42
Hungary 0.28 0.17 0.34 Venezuela, RB 0.26 0.15
Ireland 0.16 0.16 0.13 Average 0.47 0.26 0.42
Italy 0.25 0.15 0.26 East Asia & Pacific
Kazakhstan 0.83 0.38 0.72 Australia 0.15 0.09 0.08
Latvia 0.44 0.28 0.50 China 0.68 0.33 0.50
Lithuania 0.25 0.15 0.25 Indonesia 1.23 0.46 0.89
Netherlands 0.16 0.10 0.14 Japan 0.13 0.07 0.14
Norway 0.21 0.13 0.22 Korea, Rep. (South) 0.10 0.06 0.07
Poland 0.19 0.10 0.21 Mongolia 0.57 0.30 0.67
Portugal 0.22 0.13 0.26 New Zealand 0.09 0.08 0.07
Romania 0.34 0.17 0.32 Philippines 0.51 0.29 0.62
Russian Federation 0.39 0.23 0.36 Thailand 0.88 0.43 0.88
Slovak Republic 0.53 0.27 0.37 Average 0.48 0.23 0.44
Slovenia 0.18 0.18 0.18 South Asia
Spain 0.20 0.12 0.20 India 0.52 0.22 0.37
Sweden 0.11 0.06 0.13 Sub-Sahara Africa
Switzerland 0.13 0.08 0.13 South Africa 0.35 0.22 0.41
Turkey 0.40 0.25 0.42 Tanzania 0.32 0.17 0.37
Ukraine 0.51 0.24 0.58 Middle East & North Africa
United Kingdom 0.28 0.12 0.33 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.77 0.33 0.56
Uzbekistan 0.52 0.32 0.51 Malta 0.17 0.14 0.07
Average 0.28 0.17 0.29
just the coefficient of variation CV and leave it to the reader to compare results of alternative
concentration measures. Differences are not very large since the pairwise correlation coefficient
between the indicators is 0.91 or higher. Let me first comment the results for Europe & Central
Asia. The countries with the lowest regional inequality based on the coefficient of variation (CV )
sub-national units of the countries considered, see Hale (2003) for details.
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are Denmark (0.11), Sweden (0.11) and the Netherlands (0.16); the countries with the highest
level of regional inequality are Kazakhstan (0.83), Uzbekistan (0.52), and Slovak Republic (0.53).
Obviously, regional inequalities are higher in less developed economies. Despite, Belgium (0.38)
and the United Kingdom (0.28) are rich countries with quite high regional disparities implying
that development is an important but not the only determinant. The unweighted average of
countries in Europe & Central Asia is 0.28. Turning to the North American region it is noticeable
that Canada and the United States of America have regional inequalities which are quite large
compared to core European countries, although the level of economic development is similar. In
the country groups Latin America & Caribbean and East & South Asia, the first observation
is that inequality is on average much higher compared to Europe & Central Asia supporting the
aforementioned development-inequality hypothesis. Within the group of East Asia & Pacific, there
are large differences in regional inequality which also can also be attributed to large differences in
economic development. New Zealand and Korea have an even smaller level of regional inequality
than the Scandinavian countries mentioned above.
For an empirical analysis, it is also important to have data varying within countries over time. To
get a first impression of the changes of regional inequality I have plotted the CV in Figure 1 for a
sample of countries. I have chosen the United States of America and Canada as Anglo-American
countries; the United Kingdom; Germany, Austria, and Belgium for core European countries; and
India, Bolivia, and the Republic of Korea represent other parts of the world. In the U.S. and
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Figure 1: Trends in regional inequality 1980-2009
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Canada, we observe a quite high variation over time, with high levels of regional inequality at
the beginning of the observation period, followed by a decline in the 1990s, and rising inequalities
since 2000. In the U.K., regional inequalities are on rise in general. Interestingly, the current
level is almost identical compared with the group of Anglo-American countries suggesting that
political factors might be important here. In Germany and Austria, regional inequalities are also
similar, but inequalities are increasing in Germany but decreasing in Austria. Belgium faces high
regional inequalities, which are almost monotonously decreasing over time. This is an interesting
fact for the following discussion on decentralization and regional inequality, since Belgium faces at
the same time a strong decentralization trend. India shows high and strongly increasing regional
inequality as Bolivia does, while South Korean ”equality” is obviously very stable over time. So
far, we can say from the analysis that inequalities vary between countries as well as over time,
which is important for the investigation of its determinants.
3 Decentralization and regional inequality
The previous section has given an overview on the main facts of regional inequality. As stressed
in the introduction, regional inequalities are not just an outcome of geography or economic devel-
opment, but also affected by state interventions. In particular, the federal design of countries may
play an important role in regional inequalities. In this section I discuss the theoretical background
as well as existing empirical studies.
3.1 Theoretical background
A growing share of the global population is living in federal countries reaching nowadays about 40%
[Watts (2008)]. In this process, countries are not just decentralizing responsibilities and budgetary
power to local levels of government, but they also shift into the direction of a political federalism
by adopting (quasi) federal constitutions as in the case of Spain and Belgium. Federations are
formed as a system of sub-national units with free markets and some degree of political autonomy
incorporated to one national entity. This organizational form has two main advantages: on the
one hand, economic and social integration guarantee free trade and factor mobility to exploit the
efficiency gains from common markets. On the other hand, decentralized decision making ensures
that local policies fit to the needs of a heterogeneous population with different regional tastes
[Oates (1972)].
Besides these efficiency gains from decentralization, politicians and researchers are concerned about
potential negative redistributive consequences, since ”unfettered fiscal decentralization is likely to
lead to a concentration of resources in a few geographical locations and thus increase fiscal dispar-
ities across sub-national governments” [Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), p. 1605]. Several
arguments are important here. Following Prud’homme (1995), fiscal decentralization weakens the
budgetary power of the central government thereby reducing the scope to redistribute resources
from the richer to the poorer regions. At the same time, decentralization often involves fiscal
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competition, which may be at the cost of poor regions. Prud’homme argues, that richer regions
will have a larger tax base than poorer regions and will therefore either collect more taxes and
provide more local public goods or they provide the same quantity and quality of public goods at
lower tax rates. In any case, mobile factors will prefer richer jurisdictions, ”enlarging the tax base
and increasing the gap in income between regions” [Prud’homme (1995), p. 203]. Prud’homme
concludes from his analysis that ”decentralization can be the mother of segregation”. Another
issue concerning the relationship between decentralization and regional inequalities is the redistri-
bution aspect. According to Oates (1972) sub-national governments have no suitable redistributive
instruments. If sub-national governments raise taxes in order to equalize – say between individuals
or regions– , such programms are not likely to succeed because mobile factors can easily move to
other jurisdictions undermining the goals of such programs [Pauly (1973)]. Hence, if governments
aim to equalize living standards across regions, the tax-transfer-scheme should be implemented at
a higher centralized government level [Musgrave (1959)]. Regional inequality might also be a direct
consequence of decentralization. In a standard Tiebout framework, decentralization implies that
public goods provision is stratified due to the different preferences of a heterogeneous population
[Tiebout (1956)]. Thus, ”there is clearly a tension between pursuing goals of equality in service
provision and greater decentralization and choice” [Besley and Ghatak (2003), p. 245].
Besides the potential negative redistributional effects of decentralization, there are also arguments
for equity promoting consequences, most of them related to enhanced efficiency of local public
policies. Following the decentralization theorem, sub-national authorities can better provide the
economically efficient quantity and quality of local public goods, since they are better informed
about local needs [Oates (1972)]. This greater public efficiency at the local level might stimulate
regional growth and convergence [Oates (1993)]. Moreover, decentralization gives sub-national
governments the opportunity to actively pursue economic development policies, which better fit to
the strengths and weaknesses of their regions than central government policies. With a certain de-
gree of sub-national autonomy, local officials get the opportunity to attract mobile capital to their
particular regions, e.g., by granting tax privileges or offering other forms of assistance [Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2003)]. Decentralization is also accompanied by inter-jurisdictional compet-
ition forcing governments to represent citizen interests and to preserve markets, since competition
acts as a disciplinary device to punish sub-national government officials for inappropriate mar-
ket intervention [Weingast (1995), Qian and Weingast (1997)]. For example, local governments
could be removed if they fail to achieve standards of wealth and growth comparable with those
of the rest of the country, or people ”vote with their feet” instead. Following Qian and Wein-
gast (1997) decentralization gives less developed regions an important instrument to compete with
richer ones by providing more attractive investment conditions, e.g., by means of more flexible
labor markets or a less generous welfare state. “Jurisdictional competition can therefore reduce
regional inequality without centrally-mandated redistribution”[Qian & Weingast (1997), p. 87].
This view is supported by some anecdotal evidence of U.S. states. After the War of Secession,
regional inequalities were high since the defeated South had fallen far behind the North. But local
growth-enhancing policies, e.g. in terms of more flexible labor market conditions, helped the poor
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South to catch up with the rich North decreasing regional inequalities [McKinnon (1997)]. The
European Union as confederation of member states provides with Ireland an example showing how
important autonomy is for successful regional politics which is quite similar to some extent. Dur-
ing the 1990s Ireland converged rapidly to core European economic prosperity, since they had the
autonomy to levy much lower taxes. The Irish autonomy in decision making was a crucial factor
to overcome the disadvantages caused by its peripheral location. Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
conclude that centralization or harmonization would have prevented this convergence process. The
discussion shows that decentralization can strengthen regional growth and contribute to a more
equal factor distribution.
The existing literature discusses the efficiency enhancing effects of decentralization which might
also promote equality among regions. Recent studies, however, challenge efficiency gains from
decentralization in developing countries. Tanzi (1996) discusses the effects of decentralization in
developing countries stressing that decentralization might cause coordination problems, excessive
regulation, higher administrative costs or poor quality of local bureaucrats. Moreover, decent-
ralization might increase corruption and cronyism in developing countries undermining potential
efficiency gains [Bardhan (2002), Lessmann and Markwardt (2010)]. Hence, while many of the
assumptions that link decentralization to lower regional inequality may be valid for high developed
countries, this may not be the case in developing economies [Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010)].
Another argument for development being decisive for the impact of decentralization on regional in-
equality is related to the higher redistributive capacity in rich countries. Rich countries may offset
the negative redistributive consequences of decentralization through interregional redistribution
policies, for which a high fiscal capacity is important.
Based on the theoretical discussion, the overall effect of decentralization on regional inequality
is ambiguous, since negative redistributional consequences may be offset by efficiency gains at
the local level. Thus, the aim of the following sections is to investigate the relationship between
decentralization and regional inequalities empirically. Moreover, the discussion shows that the
development stage might be important, since efficiency gains from decentralization are less likely
in developing countries compared to industrial economies. The empirical analysis aims at testing
this issue using interaction variables of decentralization and income.
3.2 Related empirical studies
Empirical literature on the relationship between decentralization and regional inequality is scarce
and inconclusive. Existing studies can be grouped by single-country case studies, cross-country
studies of high developed countries, and cross-country studies using data of both high and low
developed countries. Single-country studies are Kanbur and Zhang (2005) for China, Kim et al.
(2003) for Korea, Bonet (2006) for Colombia, and Akai and Hosio (2009) for the United States. In
the Chinese case, decentralization has increased regional inequality, and a similar result emerges
from the Colombian departments. In Korea the effect is ambiguous, but in the U.S., decentral-
ization has decreased regional inequalities. Thus, country-level evidence is mixed. Gil Canaleta
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et al. (2004), Ezcurra and Pascual (2008), and Lessmann (2009) study the impact of decentral-
ization on regional inequalities based on OECD countries, finding regional inequalities decreasing
in the degree of decentralization. Shankar and Shah (2003), Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill (2004), and
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) also take developing countries into account. Shankar and Shah
(2003) find lower regional inequalities in federal countries, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill (2004) found
a positive relationship between rising sub-national expenditure shares and increasing regional in-
equalities, and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) provide some evidence of decentralization to
increase regional inequality in developing countries, but no robust relationship for high developed
countries. See Table A.2 in the appendix for a summary of the existing literature.
The mixed evidence can be attributed to differences in country samples, decentralization measures,
and estimation methods. In the cross-section studies, the number of countries varies from 11
[Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill (2004)] to 26 [Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010)], which is quite few
to explain between-country-differences in regional inequalities. Most studies use the degree of
expenditure decentralization – defined as the share of sub-national expenditures in total government
expenditures – as decentralization measure, but only Lessmann (2009) and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Ezcurra (2010) take indicators into account which reflect the political autonomy of sub-national
governments at least to a certain extent. Thus, some important arguments of the theoretical
literature related to the political autonomy of sub-national governments have only sparsely been
tested. Concerning the estimation procedures only the most recent cross-country studies by Ezcurra
and Pascual (2008), Lessmann (2009), and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) make use of panel
data, which has several advantages. In particular the inclusion of country fixed effects allows
consideration of unobserved heterogeneity between countries which is very likely to be important
for regional inequalities due to geographic, political, or ethnic differences. However, also these
studies suffer from a serious problem which may be caused by endogeneity [see section 4.3 for
details]. (Central) governments might react with changes in the federal structure on changes
in regional inequalities. Thus, decentralization has to be treated as an endogenous regressor,
which is difficult in small country samples. The aforementioned panel data studies use lagged
decentralization measures as instruments for contemporary levels of decentralization, which is quite
problematic. The underlying data set of my analysis considers more than twice as much countries
than the existing literature, so that there is much more cross-country variation in the data making
it easier to find appropriate instrumental variables. To sum up, this paper aims to overcome the
shortcomings of the existing literature by using a much bigger data set, various measures reflecting
political and fiscal decentralization, and more appropriate econometric methods.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and methodology
Before explaining the methodology and the results of the regression analysis, let me first introduce
the data. Two groups of variables are particularly important for this study: measures of regional
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inequality and decentralization measures. The first have been discussed in detail in section 2 so it
remains to present the decentralization variables. The theoretical discussion showed that the par-
ticular federal design matters for the relationship between decentralization and regional inequality.
Several measurement concepts are used in the literature to find appropriate approximations [see
e.g. Treisman (2002) and Rodden (2004)]. In general, decentralization is viewed as the devolution
of authority towards sub-national governments, with total government authority over society and
economy perceived as fixed. Attempts to define and measure decentralization have focused on fiscal
authority rather than political autonomy. In our context, I am interested in both issues, since the
degree of local autonomy should be important.
Decentralization measures reflecting fiscal authority can be approximated by using measures of
fiscal decentralization, which can be calculated from the IMF Government Finance Statistics.
Those measures include the degree of expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC ) and the degree of
revenue decentralization (REVDEC ), which relate expenditures (revenues) of sub-national gov-
ernments to total government expenditures (revenues). Both measures are commonly used in the
decentralization literature. However, those indicators do not necessarily reflect sub-national gov-
ernment autonomy in decision-making, since the central government may also determine spending
at the local level through central government legislation. To capture these effects, a commonly
used measure based on budgetary accounts is the so called vertical imbalance (VIMB). This meas-
ure relates central government transfers to sub-national government expenditures, and is therefore
a measure of transfer dependency of sub-national governments. Note that a high value of this
measure indicates little local financial autonomy, while all other decentralization measures are
defined such that a high value represents a high degree of decentralization. The vertical imbalance
measure is in particular interesting in our context, since it also reflects to some extent the import-
ance of intergovernmental transfers, which often redistribute between regions in order to equalize
living standards and to reduce regional inequalities. A last measure of fiscal decentralization is
the degree of tax decentralization, which relates the tax revenues of sub-national governments to
total government revenues (TAXDEC ). It represents an alternative fiscal indicator of sub-national
government financial autonomy incorporating the degree of inter-jurisdictional competition. Note
however, that all these measures are imperfect in so far that they do not reflect the political
dimension of the underlying decision-making process. Assume for example that the central govern-
ment determines the tax base and sub-national governments determine the tax rate. In this case
the tax decentralization index might indicate a high degree of financial autonomy, although the
central government has the major influence on sub-national revenues. Decentralization measures
incorporating this problem were developed by Rodden (2004) and Stegarescu (2005), but are not
applicable here since they only cover OECD countries.5 Note that all decentralization measures
are only available until 1998, since there was reorganization in the IMF statistics in 2001. More
recent data is not comparable to the long time series data used for this analysis.
To capture the dimension of political decentralization I refer to decentralization measures provided
5 See Lessmann (2009) for an empirical analysis of decentralization and regional inequality using those decentral-
ization measures.
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by Daniel Treisman [see Treisman (2008)]. A first measure of political decentralization is a dummy
variable for those countries, which have a federal constitution (FEDERAL).6 A decentralization
measure reflecting the vertical fragmentation of governments is the number of vertical government
tiers (TIERS ), which ranges from 1 to 6. Most OECD countries have 3 or 4 levels of government
according to this indicator. The theoretical literature on decentralization and regional inequality
stresses sub-national government efficiency, which might increase with the degree of local autonomy.
For this purpose, Treisman created several dummy variables based on the constitutions of coun-
tries. A sub-national legislature is said to have ‘residual authority’, if the constitution assigns the
exclusive right to legislate on issues that are not specifically assigned to one level of government
(RESID). Another measure captures the ‘autonomy’ of a sub-national legislature. It is said to
exist if the constitution reserves exclusive decision-making power on any specific task (AUTON ). I
also sum up both measures to a joint indicator of sub-national autonomy (AUTRES ). Treisman’s
data also contains data on local elections (electoral decentralization), which is important to incor-
porate electoral accountability arguments. One measure is a dummy variable, which becomes one,
if there are elections at the lowest government level (BOTEL); a second measure is again a dummy
variable, which is one, if there are elections at the second lowest government level (SECEL). I
combine these measures to a new dummy variable indicating whether there are elections at any
sub-national level of government or not (BOSEC ).
Beside measures of fiscal and political decentralization, I use the share of sub-national government
employment in total government employment as a further decentralization indicator (EMPLDEC )
which cannot be assigned to one of the two categories. The data is also provided by Treisman
(2008). In this case, the analysis is purely explorative, since there is no theoretical prediction con-
cerning the impact of public sector employment decentralization on regional inequality. Table A.3
in the appendix provides pairwise correlations of the different decentralization measures based on
the 56 countries considered in the empirical analysis where the number of observations varies by
data availability. It turns out, that the decentralization measures indeed reflect various character-
istics of the government structure which might be helpful to test different theories. Data sources
and definitions of all considered variables are provided in Table A.4 in the appendix.
4.2 Estimation design
The empirical analysis of this study is carried out in three steps. The first step is to relate the
decentralization measures to regional inequality in a cross-section of countries which uses long
period averages from 1980-2009. The basic empirical model has the following form:
REGINEQi = α+
k∑
j=1
βjCONTROLj,i + γDECi + i. (4)
6 The following criteria have to be fulfilled to be counted as a federal country: Countries have at least two levels
of government, which share parts of the executive and legislative authority; sub-national governments have a
representation in the federal parliament (second chamber); there is a duty to obtain consent on constitutional
amendments; a constitutional jurisdiction solves disputes between organs of state; institutions foster collaboration
[see Watts (2008)].
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REGINEQi reflects one of the alternative measures of regional inequality (CV, GINI, or WCV )
in country i, α is a constant, CONTROLj,i are k exogenous control variables affecting inequality,
DECi represents one of the different decentralization measures, and i is a random error term.
These benchmark results provide us a first impression on how decentralization might impact dis-
parities. Since countries might react with a change in the level of decentralization in response to
increasing or decreasing disparities, I also treat decentralization as endogenous regressor to incor-
porate a potential endogeneity bias. Thereby, I refer to a cross-section of countries instead of panel
data, since the major determinants of decentralization are time-invariant factors. The second step
of the analysis is to estimate panel data models, where the estimation equation takes the form:
REGINEQi,t = αi +
k∑
j=1
βjCONTROLj,i,t + γDECi,t + µt + i,t. (5)
In case of the time-varying measures of fiscal decentralization I include country fixed effects (αi),
but random effects otherwise (time indexed by t). The regressions use the original annual frequency
of the data as well as 5-year period averages. The third step of the analysis is to investigate whether
the level of economic development has an impact the relationship between decentralization and
regional inequality. For this purpose, I estimate a panel data model using interaction variables of
decentralization and the log of the GDP per capita (GDPPC ):
REGINEQi,t = αi +
k∑
j=1
βjCONTROLj,i,t +γ1DECi,t +γ2DECi,t×GDPPCi,t +µt + i,t. (6)
Note that the GDP per capita and its squared value also enter the regression as controls therefore
the interaction model is fully specified [Brambor et al. (2006)]. The estimations are again based
on random effects and fixed effects models using annual data as well as period averages.
The set of control variables is the same in all specifications. One issue intruding from the look on
the data in section 2 is a potential link between regional inequality and economic development.
An explanation provide Kuznets (1955) and Williamson (1965). In his seminal paper, Kuznets
conjectured that as countries develop from farm-based economies to industrial economies, income
inequality first increases, peaks, and then decreases. Thus, the trajectory of this relationship
is inverse-U-shaped – what we call the Kuznets curve today. Williamson has adopted this idea
for the case of interregional inequality. He argues that the industrialization was driven by the
discovery and utilization of natural resources such as coal or iron. Since those natural resources
are normally not equally distributed within countries, economic prosperity in the industrialization
process is also unequally distributed, therefore regional inequalities rise in this process. Later, the
more attractive employment opportunities in the booming regions attract workers from abroad
depressing wages in the settled regions but increasing wages in home regions. Thus, a natural
convergence process starts in which regional inequality falls drawing again an inverse-U-shaped
relationship. To test this theory, I control for the Log of the GDP per capita (GDPPC ) as well as
its squared value (GDPPC 2). Moreover, I control for the number of regions which has been used to
calculate the inequality measures (UNITS ), since the territorial level is not always comparable over
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all countries considered. Controlling for the number of regions should incorporate a measurement
error caused by heterogeneity.7 In addition, I control for the size of a country considering the
log of area in square kilometers (AREA). Related studies such as Lessmann (2009) have shown
that the unemployment ratio (UNEMPL) effects regional inequalities so I also control for this.
Since Gianetti (2002) and Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2006) propose an impact of international
trade on regional disparities I control for the sum of imports and exports as a share of the GDP
(OPENNESS ). A particularly important determinant of regional economic inequality may be the
heterogeneity of the population living in the different parts of a country. The different regions are
often inhabited by different ethnic groups. Examples include Belgium with the Dutch-speaking
Flemings living in the northern part and the French-speaking Walloons in the south, or India
with the Indo-Aryans in the north and Dravidians in the south. The ethnic diversity may result
in ethnic discrimination or conflict promoting the divergence of regions. Thus, I control for the
degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ETHNO) as calculated by Alesina et al. (2003). To
capture agglomeration effects, I also control for the share of urban living population (URBAN ).8
4.3 Cross-section results
Following I present the benchmark results from OLS regressions. I use long period averages of all
variables for 56 countries covering the period from 1980-2009. The results are presented in Table 2.9
The different specifications suggest a negative impact of decentralization on regional inequality.
Most decentralization variables have a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant from
zero in case of the federal dummy (column 1), the measure of residual and local autonomy (column
5), the measure of elections at sub-national government tiers (column 8), the degree of expenditure
decentralization (column 9), and the degree of revenue decentralization (column 10). Thus, both
measures of political as well as all measures of fiscal decentralization seem to impact regional
inequality in a similar direction. The regressions explain 70%-80% of the variation in regional
inequalities between countries as indicated by the adjusted R-squared.
Interestingly, my selection of control variables supports the theoretical findings concerning the
inverse-U-shaped relationship between regional inequality and economic development. Moreover,
a higher fragmentation is positively correlated with regional inequality as is the geographical size.
Countries with high levels of unemployment face lower regional inequality. A possible explanation
for this somewhat counterintuitive result can be the unemployment insurance: This social insurance
– as it exists in most countries considered – redistributes indirectly between rich and poor regions
so that inequalities fall. A similar result find Kaufman et al. (2003) for Canadian provinces.
More open economies have higher regional inequalities, and also more heterogeneous countries
as reflected by the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization are more heterogeneous in terms of
7 I have also experimented with average size of regions (units per area) and other indicators for fragmentation, but
the number of units turned out to be the most important determinant.
8 Following Lessmann (2009) I have also used a concentration measure of the population within countries which
does not turn out to impact regional inequality significantly.
9 Robustness tests using the weighted coefficient of variation (WCV ) and the Gini coefficient (GINI ) as dependent
variables support the general findings. The results are available from the author upon request.
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regional economic activity. Finally, I find countries with a higher share of urban living people
having lower regional inequalities.
4.4 Endogeneity
The benchmark findings are, however, just a first step of this analysis since endogeneity might bias
the estimates. Different channels are important here. Assume for example a federal government
faces increasing regional inequalities. This might cause the government to centralize the budget in
order to have more scope for redistributive policies. Of course, also the opposite reaction might
occur, if the central government believes that decentralized decisions are necessary for regional
convergence. That’s one possible reason for measures of fiscal decentralization being endogenous.
Another reason can be a mechanical association of measures of regional inequality and measures
of fiscal decentralization, which are in particular important for panel analysis focusing on within
country variation. Consider a federation consisting of two jurisdictions, a rich region and a poor
region. Suppose further that the sub-national governments associated with the two regions fin-
ance their expenditures mainly through flat taxes on property, but the central government has a
progressive tax structure under which income in the rich region faces a higher marginal tax rate
than does income in the poor region. What happens in this model if a negative technological shock
harming just the rich region causes a decrease in regional inequality? Sub-national revenues are
unchanged given equal tax rates on property yet federal revenues fall given that the income in
the rich region is taxed at a lower rate now. If this happens we should observe an increase of the
degree of revenue decentralization as an outcome of an exogenous decrease in regional inequality.
Thus, decentralization – in particular measures of fiscal decentralization – have to be treated as
endogenous variables.
I provide different approaches to reduce the potential endogeneity bias. The first is to use cross-
country data with long period averages, since the mechanical association of regional inequality
and decentralization measures is less important in regressions using between country variations in
contrast to panel regressions which focus on the within country variation. This empirical strategy
was not an option in the existing literature, since the underlying data sets – with a maximum
number of 26 countries – are too small for reliable cross-section estimations. The findings aim
at a negative impact of decentralization on regional inequality as discussed above. The second
approach are instrumental variable (IV) regressions in a two stage least squares (TSLS) procedure
using exogenous determinants of decentralization measures. Again this is possible due to the higher
number of observations in my data set. Finally, the third approach is to apply panel estimations
with long period averages considering country fixed effects (if possible).
Instrumental variable regressions are quite difficult in this context, since I need exogenous determ-
inants of decentralization, which are independent of the level of regional inequalities. Standard
instruments for decentralization as used in the literature are the size of a country or the degree
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization [see e.g. Wasylenko (1987), Arikan (2004), or Lessmann and
Markwardt (2010)]. However, these instruments are not applicable in my context since they are
16
linked to regional inequality through other channels than decentralization. Therefore, I propose
several new instruments for the different measures of decentralization which are related to the insti-
tutional structure, colonial origin, and the composition of the society. Note that I use different sets
of instruments for the different decentralization measures depending on the first-stage regression
diagnostics.
One of the instrumental variables is the share of the population that speaks a major European
language (EURLANG). This variable reflects the influence of Western European countries [Hall
and Jones (1999)], which I expect to be positively correlated with decentralization. Historically, the
federal idea dates back to the Alte Eidgenossenschaft in Switzerland (1291-1798) and can be seen
as a European invention which diffused all over the world through colonial activities and settlers
[Acemoglu et al. (2002)]. Thus, countries with a historical link to Western Europe are expected
to have a higher degree of decentralization. Also the level and experience with democracy is an
important determinant of the federal structure of a country. Those countries which have long
democratic traditions have acknowledged more and more voice to the people over time. To get a
better representation of local tastes in politics, democratic countries have organized the government
in smaller units implying an increase in the degree of (political) decentralization. Therefore, I use
different indicators of democracy as instrument including the number of years of democracy since
1800 (DEMO18 ), the democracy index of the Polity2 data set (DEMOP2 ), the overall Polity2
index (POLITY2 ), and the number of years of uninterrupted democracy since 1950 (INTDEMO).
Moreover, the existence of a common or civil law system might be a useful instrument. A common
law system – as it exists in the U.S. or the UK – can be seen as a kind of decentralized structure,
where local courts decide on legal issues that become common law for the whole federation in
the process of adjudication, whereas the civil law is developed at a central level. Therefore, I use
a dummy variable for a common law (LAW ) system as further instrument for decentralization.
Related to this idea is the use of the legal origin of a country as instrument [Porta et al. (2008)].
Those countries which have a German legal origin (LEGOR) are expected to be more decentralized.
The last instrument – that works quite good for measures of fiscal decentralization – is the share
of Protestants in the total population (PTANTS ). The Protestant Church is less hierarchically
structured than other denominations, it promotes individualism, and it supports the protection of
minorities [Treisman (2000)]. These values and norms are reflected by the society, and their request
for decentralization, which is a well-suited government structure to realize these fundamentals. In
contrast, the Catholic Church and the Islam have a hierarchical, centralized structure with one or
few religious leaders at the head – the pope or the mufti. This structure carries over the society
and government organization. Thus, I expect countries with a high share of Protestants to be
more decentralized. The results of the instrumental variable estimations, where I make use of the
different instruments case by case, are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Cross-section results, IV estimates
Dependent variable: Coefficient of variation of regional GDP p.c. 1980-2009 (CV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-stage regression results
GDPPC 0.735*** 0.418 0.849** 0.185 0.301 0.604**
(3.22) (1.49) (2.24) (0.61) (1.10) (2.27)
(GDPPC)2 -0.044*** -0.023 -0.051** -0.013 -0.020 -0.040***
(-3.37) (-1.44) (-2.43) (-0.75) (-1.27) (-2.56)
UNITS 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(3.58) (3.21) (3.48) (3.27) (3.57) (3.71)
AREA 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.035* 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.031**
(2.86) (2.69) (1.84) (2.97) (3.12) (2.07)
UNEMPL -0.017*** -0.008 -0.012 -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.018***
(-4.13) (-1.45) (-1.63) (-3.99) (-4.62) (-3.88)
OPENNESS 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(4.04) (2.12) (0.75) (3.05) (3.08) (2.75)
ETHNIC 0.378*** 0.565*** 0.157 0.300*** 0.322*** 0.337***
(3.19) (3.15) (1.26) (3.57) (3.76) (3.41)
URBAN -0.003* -0.004* -0.003 -0.004** -0.004** -0.003
(-1.91) (-1.92) (-1.39) (-2.37) (-2.45) (-1.63)
FEDERAL -0.166*
(-1.68)
AUTRES -0.387**
(-2.18)
BOSEC -0.229***
(-2.65)
EXPDEC -0.004***
(-2.60)
REVDEC -0.004***
(-2.84)
TAXDEC -0.003*
(-1.71)
Constant -3.345*** -2.400* -3.122* -0.655 -1.133 -2.186
(-3.02) (1.80) (-1.86) (-0.49) (-0.92) (-1.82)
Obs. 48 51 48 42 42 42
Adj.-R2 0.73 0.52 0.47 0.80 0.81 0.76
First-stage regression diagnostics
A.P. F-statistic 5.78 4.61 4.46 12.06 15.37 3.46
Prob > F 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
Partial R2 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.46 0.55 0.18
Hansen J 0.08 - 0.06 4.14 3.95 5.16
Hansen-J (p) 0.78 - 0.80 0.25 0.27 0.16
Excluded instruments
EURLANG DEMOP2 LAW PTANTS PTANTS PTANTS
DEMO18 POLITY2 LEGOR LEGOR LEGOR
EURLANG EURLANG EURLANG
INTDEMO INTDEMO INTDEMO
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Estimates with instrumental variables are applied to those decentralization measures, that have
turned out to impact significantly regional inequality in the benchmark OLS regressions above.10
The upper part of the table presents the results of the second stage regression, the lower part
reports first stage regression diagnostics and the considered instruments. Importantly, the coeffi-
cients of the different measures of political and fiscal decentralization are negative and statistically
significant at conventional confidence levels implying that decentralization decreases regional in-
equality. The regression diagnostics indicate, however, that the instruments are only meaningful
in case of the degree of expenditure decentralization (column 4), and the degree of revenue decent-
ralization (column 5). The other regressions might suffer from a weak instrument bias. Table A.5
in the appendix reports results of OLS and TSLS regressions using the alternative measures of
regional inequality (GINI and WCV ) as dependent variable supporting the major finding.
4.5 Panel evidence
The cross-section estimates have a major drawback, since there may exist other country-specific
factors effecting regional inequality which cannot be considered by the control variables due to
the limited number of degrees of freedom or unobservability. This problem may bias estimates, al-
though the adjusted R-squares indicate a quite good fit of the empirical model. Panel data models,
however, can help to overcome this problem, since they allow to investigate within country vari-
ations by including country fixed effects incorporating unobserved heterogeneity [Baltagi (2005)].
Unfortunately, the use of panel data is not a free lunch in this context, since there are no instru-
ments for decentralization available which vary over time. Remember the instruments used in the
previous section. Thus, I can deal with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by using panel
data, but it is not possible to consider a potential endogeneity problem convincingly. I refrain to in-
strument with lagged decentralization measures as done by previous studies, since decentralization
is a persistent phenomenon so that lagged decentralization measures are not exogenous.
My empirical approach for the panel data analysis is twofold. First, I use the original annual fre-
quency of the data set providing me with almost 800 observations between 1980 and 2009. Second,
I consider potential business cycle effects building 5-year period averages. This should also help
to deal with the second source of endogeneity as discussed above. In both data sets, I estimate
random effects and fixed effects models. Measures of political decentralization are not varying over
time, so that it is impossible to include country fixed effects. The only way to deal with this prob-
lem is to use random effects or to estimate a cross-section as in the previous section. In contrast
to measures of political decentralization, the measures of fiscal decentralization vary over time so
that I can include country fixed effects here. The estimation results of equation (5) are reported in
Table 4 considering the annual panel.11 Note that I just report coefficients of the decentralization
measures due to space limitations; all control variables are similar to the cross-section estimations
10 In the other cases, I was not able to find any significant effects. The results are available from the author upon
request.
11 Table A.6 in the appendix reports results considering 5-year period averages, which support the findings based on
the annual panel, although significance levels are lower due to the smaller number of available degrees of freedom.
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Table 4: Panel results (annual data)
Dependent variable: Coefficient of variation of regional GDP p.c. (CV)
Random effects Fixed effects
Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2 Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2
FEDERAL -0.071 795 (56) 0.57 – – –
(-1.44)
TIERS 0.027 790 (55) 0.56 – – –
(0.54)
AUTON -0.051 765 (52) 0.56 – – –
(-1.29)
RESID -0.052 775 (52) 0.60 – – –
(-1.28)
AUTRES -0.095** 783 (53) 0.60 – – –
(-2.29)
BOTEL -0.135** 749 (51) 0.53 – – –
(-2.25)
SECEL -0.080** 728 (48) 0.47 – – –
(-1.98)
BOSEC -0.076*** 728 (49) 0.49 – – –
(-2.59)
EXPDEC -0.002*** 350 (35) 0.55 -0.003*** 350 (35) 0.17
(-3.00) (-3.86)
REVDEC -0.001 350 (35) 0.56 -0.003** 350 (35) 0.17
(-1.63) (-2.26)
TAXDEC 0.000 353 (35) 0.59 0.000 353 (35) 0.19
(1.32) (0.68)
VIMB 0.000 344 (34) 0.59 0.000 344 (34) 0.15
(-0.01) (0.59)
EMPLDEC 0.000 700 (46) 0.52 – – –
(-0.20)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
and included in each regression. The random effects estimates based on the annual panel report
a negative and significant impact of the autonomy variable (AUTRES ), the variables of electoral
decentralization (BOTEL, SECEL, and BOSEC ), and the degree of expenditure decentralization
(EXPDEC ). Turning to the fixed effects estimates, the degree of expenditure decentralization (EX-
PDEC ) as well as the degree of revenue decentralization (REVDEC ) turn out to negatively impact
regional inequality. Table A.7 in the appendix provides robustness tests using the weighted coeffi-
cient of variation (WCV ) as well as the Gini coefficient (GINI ) as dependent variable supporting
the result of a negative impact of decentralization on regional inequality. Table A.8 provides a ro-
bustness test using 5-year period averages. I conclude from the panel estimations that unobserved
heterogeneity is obviously not a major source of bias in the estimates so that the cross-section
results are definitely meaningful.
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4.6 Interaction effects – Considering the development stage
The theoretical discussion points at different effects of decentralization on regional inequalities in
developing or emerging economies in contrast to high developed countries. The reason is that the
efficiency enhancing effects, which may contribute to regional convergence, are more likely to occur
in high developed countries due to a better institutional environment. To test this hypothesis I
estimate an interaction model as given by equation (6). The regressions include the log of the
GDP per capita (and its squared value) as control and I also let it interact with the different
decentralization measures. The results based on the annual panel data set are reported in Table 5.12
Again, I only report the coefficients of interest due to space limitations, but note that all control
variables are included in the regressions.
The regressions show a positive and significant coefficient of the decentralization measures and a
negative and significant interaction term in almost all specifications. However, I am not particularly
interested in the individual statistical significance of either of these terms. Instead, I want to
know their joint significance or, more correctly, the marginal effect of decentralization on regional
inequality depending on the level of economic development.13 The marginal effect can be calculated
using γ1 and γ2 given the GDP p.c. [see equation (6) above]:
∂REGINEQ
∂DECm
= γ1 + γ2 ·GDPPC (7)
Hence, my interaction model asserts that the effect of a change of the degree of decentralization on
regional inequality depends on the value of the conditioning variable GDP p.c. While it is possible
to calculate the marginal effect using equation (7) and the results obtained in Table 5, it is not
possible to do so for the standard errors at least in case of continuously defined decentralization
measures such as the degree of expenditure decentralization. The standard error of the marginal
effect is in this case:
σˆ ∂REGINEQ
∂DEC
=
√
var(γ1) +GDPPC
2 · var(γ2) + 2 ·GDPPC · cov(γ1γ2) (8)
The standard errors can be used to calculate confidence bands around the marginal effects. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates how the marginal effect of the degree of expenditure decentralization on regional
inequality varies with the level of economic development, and it comprises confidence bands for
the 10 percent significance level as calculated by equation (8). I concentrate on the degree of
expenditure decentralization since this is the most common indicator in the existing literature
on decentralization and regional inequality. The negative slope of the marginal effect is an out-
come of the negative coefficient of the interaction variable (γ2). For low GDP p.c. levels, the
marginal effect of decentralization on regional inequality is positive, while it is negative for high
GDP p.c. levels. The cutoff value of economic development is the value of the log GDP p.c. for
which ∂REGINEQ/∂DECm = 0 is 7.94 which corresponds to a GDP of approximately 2,800
US$ per capita. Countries poorer than this threshold might experience negative redistributional
12 Table A.9 in the appendix reports results of the 5-year averaged panel data set which support the major findings
as discussed below.
13 For an excellent overview on does and don’ts in interaction models see Brambor et al. (2006).
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Table 5: Panel results using interaction variables (annual data)
Dependent variable: Coefficient of variation of regional GDP p.c. (CV)
Random effects Fixed effects
Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2 Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2
FEDERAL 0.807*** 795 0.56 – 795 0.15
(4.20) (56) (56)
FEDERAL×GDPPC -0.097*** -0.130***
(-4.97) (-5.37)
TIERS 0.698*** 790 0.61 – 790 0.18
(2.66) (55) (55)
TIERS×GDPPC -0.080*** -0.110***
(-3.09) (-4.93)
BOTEL 0.441 749 0.52 – 749 0.05
(1.29) (51) (51)
BOTEL×GDPPC -0.071* -0.248***
(-1.79) (-3.85)
SECEL 0.524*** 728 0.47 – 728 0.07
(2.65) (49) (49)
SECEL×GDPPC -0.070*** -0.082***
(-3.19) (-3.36)
BOSEC 0.379*** 728 0.47 – 728 0.06
(2.61) (49) (49)
BOSEC×GDPPC -0.053*** -0.086***
(-3.29) (-4.01)
AUTON 0.665*** 765 0.53 – 765 0.08
(3.17) (52) (52)
AUTON×GDPPC -0.080*** -0.160***
(-3.69) (-6.16)
RESID 1.141*** 775 0.60 – 775 0.05
(5.32) (52) (52)
RESID×GDPPC -0.129*** -0.149***
(-5.82) (-5.54)
AUTRES 0.748*** 783 0.59 – 783 0.10
(4.22) (53) (53)
AUTRES×GDPPC -0.095*** -0.159
(-5.10) (-6.50)
EXPDEC 0.020*** 350 0.57 0.018*** 350 0.19
(4.40) (35) (3.30) (35)
EXPDEC×GDPPC -0.002*** -0.002***
(-5.19) (-4.00)
REVDEC 0.033*** 350 0.56 0.038*** 350 0.29
(5.74) (35) (4.36) (35)
REVDEC×GDPPC -0.004*** -0.004***
(-6.09) (-4.56)
TAXDEC 0.007** 353 0.60 0.005 353 0.19
(2.06) (35) (1.20) (35)
TAXDEC×GDPPC -0.001** 0.000
(-2.06) (-1.20)
VIMB -0.002 344 0.58 0.000 344 0.15
(-1.37) (34) (-0.15) (34)
VIMB×GDPPC 0.000 0.000
(1.46) (0.26)
EMPLDEC 0.021*** 700 0.51 700 0.12
(4.32) (46) (46)
EMPLDEC×GDPPC -0.003*** -0.003***
(-5.13) (-5.07)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of decentralization (EXPDEC) on regional inequality (CV)
consequences from expenditure decentralization, while richer countries benefit. The results repor-
ted in Table 5 suggest, the general finding of poor countries to suffer from decentralization while
rich countries benefit with respect to regional inequality holds for a wide range of econometric spe-
cifications. Therefore, the hypothesis of an impact of economic development on the relationship
between decentralization and regional inequality can be confirmed in line with Shankar and Shah
(2003) and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010). Moreover, I find no systematic differences between
the various decentralization measures. It is noteworthy that considering 5-year period averages,
the interaction effect of decentralization and economic development is only significant for measures
of political decentralization. Thus, political decentralization might be more decisive for potential
negative redistributional effects.
5 Summary and conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of political and fiscal decentralization on regional inequalities.
Theoretical considerations imply that decentralization might increase regional inequality, for ex-
ample due to a weakened redistributional capacity of the central government [Prud’homme (1995)],
but at the same time the efficiency enhancing effects of decentralization might also promote re-
gional growth and convergence [Qian and Weingast (1997)]. Existing studies on decentralization
from other research fields emphasize that the efficiency enhancing effects of decentralization are
more likely to occur in high developed countries, since decentralization might cause coordination
problems, excessive regulation, and corruption in developing countries undermining the potential
efficiency gains [Tanzi (1996)]. Hence, the impact of decentralization on regional inequality may
depend on the level of economic development: high-income countries with adequate institutions
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and high redistributional capacities might benefit from decentralization, while in developing coun-
tries the negative redistributional consequences of decentralization might offset potential efficiency
gains resulting in higher regional inequalities.
To investigate this research question, I have collected a unique data set on regional inequality
covering 56 countries between 1980 and 2009. The data shows that there is an inverse-U-shaped
relationship between regional inequality and economic development supporting Kuznets (1955)
and Williamson (1965). Moreover, I find a slight overall increase in regional inequalities in the
world. In contrast to the existing literature, the new data set allows me to apply instrumental
variable techniques in a cross-section of countries, which are best suited to solve the potential
endogeneity problems of decentralization in this context. Former studies have ignored endogeneity
or used lagged levels of decentralization measures as instruments, which are not convincing due
to its persistence over time. The econometric analysis implies, that political as well as fiscal de-
centralization have a decreasing impact regional inequalities. My interpretation of this finding is
that the efficiency enhancing effects of decentralization overcompensate negative redistributional
consequences. Furthermore, results of interaction models suggest that decentralization increases
regional inequality in less developed countries, while decentralization contributes to lower inequal-
ities in high developed countries. In general, there is no robust difference between measures of
political and fiscal decentralization.
In light of the global decentralization trend, the findings of this study have important implica-
tions for the design of governments. Several observers suspect increasing regional inequalities in
decentralizing countries and demand the implementation of interregional transfer schemes. This
study shows that this effect should not be a concern in high developed countries, since decent-
ralization decreases regional inequalities. However, the decentralization initiatives taking place in
developing countries – promoted by international development agencies such as the World Bank
– may indeed have negative redistributional consequences justifying the implementation of addi-
tional redistributional instruments. The question which instruments are suitable for this purpose
is impossible to answer based on this study. In particular, policy makers have to decide whether
to redistribute between individuals or regions. Regional inequalities contribute to interpersonal
inequalities so that it might be more efficient to redistribute between individuals using tax-transfer
schemes instead of redistributing between regions [Musgrave (1959)]. A related study by Hansen
et al. (2010) finds that interregional transfers increase regional inequalities if people are mobile, so
that interpersonal transfers seem to be more suitable to achieve a more equal income distribution.
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Table A.1: Sources of regional data by country
Country Territorial level Period Source
Argentina 23 provinces; 1 capital region 1991-2002 Direccio´n Provincial de Estad´ıstica
Australia 8 TL2 regions 1990-2008 OECD Regional Statistics
Austria 9 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Belgium 11 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Bolivia 9 departments 1988-2009 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Brazil 26 states; 1 federal district 2002-2007 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografica e
Estatistica
Bulgaria 6 TL2 regions 1995-2007 OECD Regional Statistics
Canada 12 provinces and territories
(Northwest Territories includ-
ing Nunavut)
1981-2004 Statistics Canada
Chile 13 regions 1996-2006 National Statistics Institute
China 30 provinces, autonomous re-
gions, and cities
1994-2008 National Bureau of Statistics of
China
Colombia 33 departments 1990-2007 Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estad´ıstica
Croatia 3 TL2 regions 1990-2007 OECD Regional Statistics
Czech Republic 8 TL2 regions 1990-2007 Cambridge Econometrics and
OECD Regional Statistics
Denmark 3 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Finland 6 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
France 22 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Georgia 9 provinces 2003-2009 National Statistics Office of Georgia
Germany 30 NUTS2 regions (West) 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Greece 13 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Hungary 7 NUTS2 regions 1990-2007 Cambridge Econometrics and
OECD Regional Statistics
India 28 states and union territories 1980-2005 Directorate of Economics & Stat-
istics of respective State Govern-
ments, and Central Statistical Or-
ganisation
Indonesia 33 provinces 2004-2008 Badan Pusat Statistik
Iran, Islamic Rep. 28 provinces 2000-2003 Statistical Center of Iran
Ireland 2 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Italy 20 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Japan 10 TL2 regions 1990-2005 OECD Regional Statistics
Kazakhstan 16 regions and cities 1998-2009 Agency of Statistics of the Republic
of Kazakhstan
Korea, South 7 TL2 regions 1990-2007 OECD Regional Statistics
Latvia 6 NUTS3 regions 1996-2007 EUROSTAT
Lithuania 10 NUTS3 regions 1995-2007 EUROSTAT
Malta 2 NUTS3 regions 2000-2007 EUROSTAT
Mexico 32 states; 1 capital region 1980-2006 Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y
Geograf´ıa
Mongolia 21 provinces; 1 capital region 2000-2006 National Statistical Office
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Table A.1 countinued
Country Territorial level Period Source
Netherlands 12 NUTS2 regions 1986-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
New Zealand 2 TL2 regions 2000-2003 OECD Regional Statistics
Norway 7 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Panama 9 provinces 2002-2007 Instituto Nacional De Estadistica
Peru 24 departments 2001-2009 Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica e
informa´tica - Direccio´n Nacional de
Cuentas Nacionales
Philippines 17 districts 2002-2008 National Statistics Office
Poland 16 NUTS2 regions 1990-2007 Cambridge Econometrics and
OECD Regional Statistics
Portugal 7 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Romania 8 NUTS2 regions 1995-2007 EUROSTAT
Russian Federation 7 federal regions 1998-2008 Federal State Statistics Office
Slovak Rep. 4 TL2 regions 1990-2007 Cambridge Econometrics and
OECD Regional Statistics
Slovenia 2 NUTS2 regions 1995-2007 EUROSTAT
South Africa 9 provinces 2001-2008 Statistics South Africa
Spain 18 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Sweden 8 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Switzerland 7 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Tanzania 21 administrative regions 2002-2007 National Bureau of Statistics
Thailand 7 geographic regions 2001-2009 National Statistics Office Thailand
Turkey 26 TL2 regions 1990-2006 OECD Regional Statistics
U.S. of America 51 states 1980-2008 U.S. Department of Commerce,
OECD Regional Statistics
Ukraine 27 districts 2004-2008 State Statistics Commitee of
Ukraine
United Kingdom 37 NUTS2 regions 1980-2004 Cambridge Econometrics
Uzbekistan 12 provinces; 1 republic; 1 cap-
ital region
2008 Uzbekistan in Figures - UinF
Venezuela 23 states; 1 federal district 2007 Banco Central de Venezuela
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Table A.4: Data sources & definitions
Variable Definition Source
CV Coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita various sources
GINI Adjusted Gini coefficient of regional GDP per capita various sources
WCV Population weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita various sources
GDPPC Log of the GDP per capita in 2005 $ prices. WDI 2010
UNITS Number of regions considered for the calculation of measures of regional in-
equality.
various sources
AREA Log of area in square kilometers. WDI 2010
UNEMPL Unemployment ratio. WDI 2010
OPENNESS Sum of imports and exports (total trade) as a share of the GDP. WDI 2010
ETHNIC Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is computed as one minus Herfindahl index
of ethnolinguistic group shares, and reflects the probability that two randomly
selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups.
Alesina et al.
(2003)
URBAN Share of urban living population in total population. WDI 2010
FEDERAL Dummy for countries with a federal constitution. Treisman (2008)
TIERS Number of vertical government tiers. Treisman (2008)
AUTON Local jurisdictions have a certain amount of ‘autonomy’ regarding a given
question, if the constitution reserves exclusive decision-making power on that
question.
Treisman (2008)
RESID A sub-national legislature is said to have ‘residual authority’, if the constitu-
tion assigns the exclusive right to legislate on issues that are not specifically
assigned to one level of government.
Treisman (2008)
AUTRES Sub-national governments have autonomy and/or residual autonomy. Treisman (2008)
BOTEL Dummy variable, which is one if a country has elections at the lowest tier of
government.
Treisman (2008)
SECEL Dummy variable, which is one if a country has elections at the second lowest
tier of government.
Treisman (2008)
BOSEC Sum of BOTEL and SECEL Treisman (2008)
EXPDEC The degree of expenditure decentralization relates the sum of sub-national
(state & local) government expenditures to total government expenditures.
IMF GFS
REVDEC The degree of revenue decentralization relates the sum of sub-national (state
& local) government revenues to total government revenues.
IMF GFS
VIMB Grant-share of sub-national government expenditures. IMF GFS
TAXDEC Share of sub-national government tax revenues in total government revenues. IMF GFS
EMPLDEC Share of sub-national government employment in total government employ-
ment.
Treisman (2008)
EURLANG Population share speaking a primary language of Western Europe – English,
French, German, Portuguese, and/or Spanish.
Hall and Jones
(1999)
DEMO18 Number of years of democracy since 1800. A country is assumed to be demo-
cratic if the the polity2 index provided by the PolityIV project is positive
Marshall and Jag-
gers (2009)
DEMOP2 Democracy index as provided by the PolityIV project Marshall and Jag-
gers (2009)
POLITY2 Polity2 index as provided by the PolityIV project Marshall and Jag-
gers (2009)
INTDEMO Dummy variable for countries with uninterrupted democracy (polity2 index
¿0) since 1950
Marshall and Jag-
gers (2009)
LAW Dummy variable for the English Common Law System. CIA World Fact-
book
LEGOR Dummy variable for countries with a German legal origin Porta et al. (2008)
PTANTS Population share belonging to the Protestant Church. La Porta et al.
(1999)
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Table A.5: Robustness test: OLS and TSLS using GINI and and WCV
Dependent variable: GINI Dependent variable: WCV
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2
FEDERAL -0.033* 56 0.76 -0.050 48 0.76 -0.082** 54 0.71 -0.130 46 0.69
(-1.98) (-1.24) (-2.09) (-1.24)
TIERS 0.006 55 0.74 0.028 53 0.69
(0.41) (0.92)
AUTON 0.004 52 0.75 0.003 50 0.70
(0.22) (0.05)
RESID -0.019 52 0.76 -0.019 50 0.71
(-1.10) (-0.46)
AUTRES -0.021 53 0.76 -0.136* 51 0.58 -0.042 51 0.70 -0.306* 49 0.45
(-1.29) (-1.84) (-1.00) (-1.92)
BOTEL -0.038 51 0.74 -0.045 49 0.69
(-1.40) (-0.66)
SECEL -0.010 49 0.70 -0.019 47 0.67
(-0.56) (-0.53)
BOSEC -0.015 49 0.71 -0.072** 48 0.59 -0.024 47 0.68 -0.169** 46 0.43
(-1.18) (-2.18) (-0.77) (-2.50)
EXPDEC -0.001 48 0.79 -0.002* 42 0.78 -0.004** 47 0.74 -0.003 41 0.76
-1.31 -1.69 -2.15 -1.37
REVDEC -0.001* 48 0.80 -0.002* 42 0.80 -0.004** 47 0.75 -0.003 41 0.76
(-1.93) (-1.89) (-2.49) (-1.51)
TAXDEC 0.000 48 0.78 -0.001 42 0.78 -0.001 47 0.72 -0.002 41 0.70
(-0.75) (-0.84) (-0.81) (-1.26)
VIMB 0.001 47 0.79 0.002 47 0.73
(1.44) (1.55)
EMPLDEC 0.000 46 0.75 -0.001 44 0.68
(0.68) (-0.65)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A.6: Panel results (5-year averages)
Dependent variable: Coefficient of variation of regional GDP p.c. (CV)
Random effects Fixed effects
Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2 Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2
FEDERAL -0.058 193 (56) 0.658 – – –
(-1.21)
TIERS 0.014 191 (55) 0.644 – – –
(0.34)
AUTON -0.030 183 (52) 0.648 – – –
(-0.62)
RESID -0.045 185 (52) 0.667 – – –
(-0.88)
AUTRES -0.078* 187 (53) 0.673 – – –
(-1.69)
BOTEL -0.115* 179 (51) 0.604 – – –
(-1.76)
SECEL -0.063 174 (49) 0.579 – – –
(-1.37)
BOSEC -0.062* 174 (49) 0.587 – – –
(-1.90)
EXPDEC -0.004 88 (36) 0.558 -0.007** 92 (37) 0.19
(-1.56) (-2.15)
REVDEC -0.001 88 (36) 0.604 -0.004 92 (37) 0.19
(0.56) (-1.22)
TAXDEC 0.001 88 (36) 0.643 0.000 92 (37) 0.17
(1.56) (0.53)
VIMB -0.001 86 (35) 0.625 0.000 90 (36) 0.20
(-0.85) (-0.22)
EMPLDEC 0.001 166 (46) 0.640 – – –
(0.37)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A.7: Robustness test: Annual Panel RE and FE using GINI and and WCV
Dependent variable: GINI Dependent variable: WCV
RE FE RE FE
Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2
FEDERAL -0.040** 795 0.49 – – – -0.068** 782 0.51 – – –
(-2.06) (56) (-2.18) (54)
TIERS 0.004 790 0.47 – – – 0.026 777 0.46 – – –
(0.21) (55) (0.85) (53)
AUTON -0.018 765 0.55 – – – -0.051 752 0.47 – – –
(-1.07) (52) (-1.49) (50)
RESID -0.019 775 0.55 – – – -0.013 762 0.51 – – –
(-1.11) (52) (-0.47) (50)
AUTRES -0.038** 783 0.54 – – – -0.068** 770 0.50 – – –
(-2.25) (53) (-2.27) (51)
BOTEL -0.054** 749 0.51 – – – -0.079** 736 0.47 – – –
(-2.28) (51) (-2.02) (49)
SECEL -0.020 728 0.47 – – – -0.037 715 0.40 – – –
(-1.31) (49) (-1.23) (47)
BOSEC -0.024 728 0.48 – – – -0.041** 715 0.41 – – –
(-2.15) (49) (-1.97) (47)
EXPDEC -0.001*** 350 0.45 -0.001*** 350 0.05 -0.001*** 342 0.42 -0.002*** 342 0.00
(-3.00) (35) (-4.76) (35) (-3.69) (34) (-3.14) (34)
REVDEC -0.001 350 0.46 -0.001*** 350 0.05 -0.001** 342 0.42 -0.001 342 0.15
(-1.51) (35) (-2.70) (35) (-2.04) (34) (-0.74) (34)
TAXDEC 0.000 353 0.49 0.000 353 0.05 0.000 345 0.42 0.000 345 0.00
(35) (0.56) (35) (0.10) (34) (-0.24) (34)
VIMB 0.000 344 0.49 0.000 344 0.04 0.000 344 0.42 0.000 344 0.00
(0.54) (34) (0.39) (34) (0.20) (34) (0.34) (34)
EMPLDEC 0.000 700 0.49 – – – -0.002 687 0.44 – – –
(-0.51) (46) (-1.77) (44)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A.8: Robustness test: Panel, 5-year period averages, RE and FE using GINI and and WCV
Dependent variable: GINI Dependent variable: WCV
RE FE RE FE
Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2 Coeff. Obs. R2
FEDERAL -0.026 193 0.67 – – – -0.054 189 0.63 – – –
(-1.33) (56) (-1.27) (54)
TIERS -0.002 191 0.65 – – – 0.014 187 0.60 – – –
(-0.17) (55) (0.44) (53)
AUTON -0.003 183 0.67 – – – -0.022 179 0.59 – – –
(-0.13) (52) (-0.45) (50)
RESID -0.013 185 0.68 – – – -0.004 181 0.60 – – –
(-0.60) (52) (-0.09) (50)
AUTRES -0.023 187 0.68 – – – -0.048 183 0.60 – – –
(-1.22) (53) (-1.13) (51)
BOTEL -0.045 179 0.64 – – – -0.063 175 0.56 – – –
(-1.61) (51) (-1.24) (49)
SECEL -0.016 174 0.60 – – – -0.025 170 0.53 – – –
(-0.79) (49) (-0.57) (47)
BOSEC -0.019 174 0.61 – – – -0.030 170 0.53 – – –
(-1.36) (49) (-1.05) (47)
EXPDEC -0.001* 88 0.50 -0.002*** 88 0.09 -0.001 86 0.49 -0.001 86 0.05
(-1.77) (36) (-3.14) (36) (-1.51) (35) (-1.08) (35)
REVDEC -0.001 88 0.52 -0.002 88 0.09 -0.001 86 0.49 -0.001 86 0.05
(-0.76) (36) (-2.41) (36) (-0.78) (35) (-0.52) (35)
TAXDEC 0.000 88 0.55 0.000 88 0.09 0.000 86 0.48 0.000 86 0.05
(1.31) (36) (0.30) (36) (0.01) (35) (-0.84) (35)
VIMB 0.000 86 0.54 0.000 86 0.08 0.000 86 0.48 0.000 86 0.05
(0.16) (35) (0.49) (35) (0.57) (35) (0.98) (35)
EMPLDEC 0.000 166 0.66 -0.001 162 0.59
(0.42) (46) (-0.71) (44)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A.9: Panel results using interaction variables (5-year averages)
Dependent variable: Coefficient of variation of regional GDP p.c. (CV)
Random effects Fixed effects
Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2 Coeff. Obs. Adj.-R2
FEDERAL 0.394 193 0.66 – 193 0.21
(1.35) (56) (56)
FEDERAL×GDPPC -0.051 -0.124**
(-1.63) (-2.09)
TIERS 0.283 191 0.66 – 191 0.05
(1.07) (55) (55)
TIERS×GDPPC -0.032 -0.067
(-1.10) (-1.29)
BOTEL -0.001 179 0.60 – 179 0.07
(0.00) (51) (51)
BOTEL×GDPPC -0.014 -0.125
(-0.38) (-1.17)
SECEL 0.487 174 0.56 – 174 0.08
(1.51) (49) (49)
SECEL×GDPPC -0.063* -0.104**
(-1.76) (-2.00)
BOSEC 0.235 174 0.57 – 174 0.07
(1.16) (49) (49)
BOSEC×GDPPC -0.035 -0.091**
(-1.52) (-2.20)
AUTON 0.064 183 0.65 – 183 0.19
(0.23) (52) (52)
AUTON×GDPPC -0.011 -0.108*
(-0.34) (-1.68)
RESID 0.982* 185 0.67 – 185 0.18
(1.93) (52) (52)
RESID×GDPPC -0.112** -0.170**
(-2.09) (-2.48)
AUTRES 0.368 187 0.67 – 187 0.21
(1.24) (53) (53)
AUTRES×GDPPC -0.051 -0.153***
(-1.57) (-2.64)
EXPDEC 0.020** 88 0.58 0.010 88 0.23
(1.97) (36) (0.58) (36)
EXPDEC×GDPPC -0.003** -0.002
(-2.54) (-1.09)
REVDEC 0.028*** 88 0.64 0.030 88 0.23
(3.09) (36) (1.10) (36)
REVDEC×GDPPC -0.003*** -0.004
(-3.32) (-1.24)
TAXDEC 0.013 88 0.67 -0.001 88 0.23
(1.64) (36) (-0.14) (36)
TAXDEC×GDPPC -0.001 0.000
(-1.59) (0.19)
VIMB -0.006 86 0.63 0.002 86 0.21
(-1.02) (35) (0.43) (35)
VIMB×GDPPC 0.001 0.000
(1.01) (-0.43)
EMPLDEC 0.015*** 166 0.64 – 166 0.17
(3.03) (46) (46)
EMPLDEC×GDPPC -0.002*** -0.002**
(-2.97) (-2.51)
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses; standard errors are calculated using White correction; ***,
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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